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Neither the correct conception or definition nor a precise measurement of corruption 
speaks to its causes. Without the underlying factors that lead to corrupt practices, we 
cannot develop an effective strategy to combat corrupt behavior. Three theories –
political, economic, and ethical – compete for explanatory power. Each is helpful in 
understanding corruption. Each is insufficient.
Many observers see corruption as a problem of governance and overly centralized 
political distributions of power. Robert Klitgaard’s famous formula emphasizes the 
exclusive power of the decision-maker, his or her discretion, and the lack of 
accountability for abuses of this power and discretion: C= M + D – A, or corruption 
equals monopoly plus discretion minus accountability. This theory tends to focus on 
concentrated, unaccountable power as the primary source of corruption. The more 
power and unbridled discretion officials have in their formal activities, the easier it is 
for them to extract bribes from people who need their approval, service, or assistance.
This understanding of corruption is insightful and generates a series of reform 
strategies to disperse power, reduce discretion, and increase accountability through a 
series of transparency devices and sanction mechanisms. Yet the theory fails in a few 
critical respects. First, the political lens does not focus on the other side of the 
transaction – those who try to influence public decision-making through bribes. 
Second, it does not fully appreciate the importance of underlying incentives and risks. 
And third, the theory cannot explain why – in systems where corruption is widespread 
– some public officials and private citizens refrain from corruption as a matter or 
ethics or principle.
In partial contrast to the political focus on power, discretion, and accountability, the 
economic theory of corruption locates the main determinants at the level of available 
benefits, the risk of corrupt deals, and the relative bargaining power of briber and 
bribee. Like much of the academic literature, this approach postulates that corruption 
is a “crime of calculation not passion,” and is therefore subject to rational 
justification. This economic approach focuses heavily on incentives. With poor 
wages, tough working conditions, and meager resources, officials in many countries 
have strong incentives to extort money, take bribes, and solicit gifts. The ability to 
corrupt the very processes responsible for prosecuting corrupt behavior sharply 
decreases the chances of being caught, disciplined, or prosecuted. The relative 
bargaining power of the official and the people involved, the degree of financial need, 
resources, competition, and the limitation of monetary or non-monetary sanctions 
each affect the level of corrupt practices. 
The economic lens, however illuminating, does not account for every contributing 
factor, including structural issues of access to power, wealth, and influence, nor does 
it lead necessarily to effective reforms. Countering the strong incentives to engage in 
corruption is a formidable task. Raises in wages for public officials, for example, 
have generated disappointing results. Furthermore, the theory under-appreciates the 
coercive dimension of corruption as well as the threatening nature of ethical refusals 
to take bribes. Threats of violence often coincide with the individual choice to solicit 
or refuse an illicit bribe. Furthermore, heightening the risks of corrupt practices can 
backfire. The more repressive the approach to anti-corruption, the higher the stakes, 
and the more likely corruption will pervade the very channels of law enforcement. 
The economic theory does not explain why in the face of greater rewards and lesser 
risks, some people engage in corrupt practices while others refuse. Like political 
explanations, the economic approach cannot explain why a public official would 
refuse to accept a very lucrative bribe at very little personal risk. The economic 
theory lacks solid answers for these questions.
In contrast to an evaluation of power or incentives, a third approach emphasizes the 
normative or ethical failure of society or individuals to appreciate the difference 
between right and wrong. Under this view, corruption is a moral, ethical breach, and 
the solutions emphasize a reinforcement of the ethical and legal standards of 
professional behavior through legislation, codes of ethics, and professionalism 
training. This approach helps to explain why some might resist the temptations of 
power or money; it does not explain the particular conditions under which the 
internalization of these norms in behavior is more likely to occur.   
Therefore, each of the foregoing approaches is of considerable value in providing a 
framework through which to understand corruption and chart a course of reform. 
Disbursements of power, attention to incentives, and ethical approaches to norms that 
frustrate corruption are all important dimensions of the puzzle. But each alone 
provides no single explanation or panacea. Observers of corruption as well as 
reformers, therefore, must appreciate the limits of each approach and seek to integrate 
the political delegations of power, the incentives of the actors, and the internalization 
of ethical norms into a more accurate tri-focal, behavioral theory of corrupt practices. 
Such a synthetic approach might allow us to build on our current understanding of 
corruption as a foundation for effective reform.
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